S E C R E T

9-6727

30 August 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Emergency Planning Officer

SUBJECT   : DD/I Activity During Operation Alert 1957

REFERENCE   : Memo from DD/S to the DCI, 7 June 1957, subject:
                   Participation in Operation Alert 1957; approved
                   by DCI

1. In compliance with the referenced memorandum, the DD/I
elements did not attempt problem play during Operation Alert 1957
as in previous exercises, but rather convened the planning officers
of the DD/I offices at the Relocation Center. The details of the
week's work may be found in the diary attached as Tab "A".

2. As a part of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM)
exercise, a simulated "Office of Economic Warfare" was activated.
25X1A9a [_____] ORR was the CIA representative on the
Executive Committee of the emergency economic agency. His report
is appended as Tab "B". Recommendations 4.a. and b. have been im-
plemented and c. is under study.

3. The major benefit derived by the DD/I planners from the
exercise was the opportunity to hear for the first time the progress
and forecast of the DD/P planners for the wartime operation of the
25X1A9a CIA abroad. The very able presentation made by [_____] 25X1A9a
[_____] made the DD/I officers aware of probable requirement
levies to be made on their offices by DD/P in support of wartime
operation. Accordingly, the offices are considering just where their
best contributions can be made.

4. As a final wrap-up of the exercise, a paper defining the
framework within which the DD/I area could plan operation in wartime
25X1A9a was written by the group under the chairmanship of [_____] 25X1A9a
[_____] of ORR. This paper, which is not to be considered official,
is Tab "C".

5. The service and hospitality of the Relocation Center manage-
ment was at the usual high standard of quality, and the preparations
25X1A9a made by [_____], CIA Emergency Planning Officer,
left no unexpected situations to develop.

[_____] 25X1A9a

Assistant to DD/I (Planning)

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TAB "A"

OPERATION ALERT 1957

D I A R Y

15 July 1957

An initial assemblage of the DD/I personnel was held at 1100
hours to brief the participants on the administrative aspects of
their stay at the Relocation Center.

At 1300 hours the entire CIA contingent convened in the DD/I
Area to hear presentations by the Senior War Planners of the three
Deputy Directors. [   ] [   ] of the
CIA Relocation Center, welcomed the group. He also described the
two principal missions of the Center; namely, to maintain a state
of readiness to take care of [   ] persons at all times, and to pro-
vide a Records Center, a Vital Materials Center, and a Communications
Training Center as a regular order of business.

[   ] CIA Emergency Planning Officer, dis-
cussed the CIA emergency plan. He pointed out that relocation
planning was necessary to enable the Agency to stay in business in
case of war. The present concept of operation is based on a force
of [   ] However, we are presently considering a plan in
which all surviving Agency personnel would be members of the emer-
gency team. An additional relocation site or sites are also under
study. The present site may be expanded to accommodate [   ]
[   ] [   ] also stressed the importance of the
Vital Materials Program.

[   ] Special Assistant for Planning, DD/S,
discussed the problems of support planning to prepare for wartime
operation. He pointed out that all such planning must be related
to one or more of the following four categories -- men, money,
materiel, and services. In order to know the necessary future
planning, the support elements of the Agency must know the require-
ments of the Agency.

[   ] Chief of the War Plans Division, PPC Staff,
DD/P, discussed the CIA Global War Plan. He pointed out that CIA
should have an all-Agency war plan, but that the present plan is
nothing more than a DD/P plan. The Global War Plan for Clandestine
Operation is based on an assumption of nothing less than global war.
The present basic plan, approved 31 May 1956, is being revised and
will have as annexes the Military Support Annex; National War; Over-
seas Organization Chart; Administration and Support (some of which
have already been published); Evacuation; Communications; Areas; TSS;
and Redeployment.

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25X1A9a   [_____] then discussed the DD/P War Plan Activities from the following outline:

   1. Why is DD/P involved in war planning?

        a. NSC 10-2 stated, "The Agency would be required to support military in time of war in field of clandestine activities."

        b. NSC 10-5 added to this broad directive. This was in the field of covert activities.

        c. NSCID 5 stated, "In time of war the theater command will be responsible for clandestine collection of intelligence."

    2. [_____]

25X1A

Chart 1:

Command Relationship During Wartime

US Theater Command

Joint Staff Composed of Army, Navy, AF, CIA

Army | Navy | Air Force | CIA

[_____]

25X1A

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25X1A

The Agency has been directed to support the military in time of war.
25X1A9a
[   ] Assistant to the DD/I (Planning), discussed
the wartime mission of the DD/I. He pointed out that the production
of intelligence will be the DD/I's principal function in wartime
as in peacetime. In addition to this responsibility, the DD/I will
man the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence component of the
CIA Field Commands. DD/I planning has been carried out under the
following four assumptions of type of war:

    a. All out total war with nuclear exchange of not more
than 30 days duration.

    b. The so-called "broken back" war, which starts out as
a nuclear exchange and then deteriorates to conventional war.

    c. The ~~projected five-type~~ conventional war, which
eventually spreads geographically and intensifies to
nuclear exchange.

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d. The strictly conventional war from start to finish.

16 July 1957

25X1A9a _____, Chief of the Estimates Staff, ONE, discussed national estimating in wartime according to the following outline:

ONE turns out estimates that take over a year to prepare and some that are prepared in six or eight hours. Their program has to be quite flexible. The all important thing, from ONE's point of view, is coordinating estimates. With the help of other offices, ONE can produce estimates in wartime but the question of coordinating them is the problem. One coordinated estimate is worth a thousand estimates that do not represent the views of the entire intelligence community. In a wartime situation there would be the problem of communications with the IAC agencies to consider.

1. What are we going to do in a wartime situation:

We are going to do what the NSC tells us to do. We will be working directly for them. ONE will try to anticipate their needs.

2. What sort of things will the NSC need:

Coordinated estimates. Merger of political, economic and military factors. The major lines in any given situation. In wartime situation it will be very important that we have National Intelligence Estimates speaking to these situations.

NIE's will change in character to be more pointed to the immediate situation.

Examples:

a. Likelihood of neutrals to enter war.
b. Liklihood of separate peace.
c. Reaction of USSR to certain peace overtures.
d. What will be the shape of the world at the end of hostilities?

ONE will require close support from ORR, OCI and OSI.

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3. How are we organized to do this job?

Two Sections:

    a. Board
    b. Staff

ONE's smallness of size is an asset. A roster of alumni of the organization would be useful in order to call on these people to come back to help in wartime.

ONE will operate as follows:

The DCI, NSC, other components of the Agency, etc., request an estimate.

    1. Terms of Reference--not necessary in wartime situation. Give scope briefly would be sufficient.

    2. Contributions from IAC agencies---in wartime situation these contributions may be oral; informal.

    3. Draft--necessary in wartime situation. However, it may be shorter and sharper.

    4. Final.

25X1A9a   [ ] Special Assistant to the AD/BI, talked on the use of Basic Intelligence in wartime according to the following outline:

1. _In peacetime_

The NIS Program operates on the basis that the US Government must have the fundamental information on all subjects and on all areas of the world ready for immediate use in event of war. At present, over 60% world coverage has been completed, and the amount of coverage is steadily increasing under priorities for production established by the JCS. The NIS Program is a broad, interagency activity that taps the intelligence-producing capabilities not only throughout the IAC but in certain non-IAC agencies, such as the Bureau of Mines in Interior, as well. The NIS Committee, chaired by the AD/BI, is a subcommittee of the IAC and includes members from State, Army, Navy and Air Force.

The Published NIS units -- which now number over 3,700 -- represent only a part of the total contribution made by the NIS Program. Under the stimulation of the program, all contributing agencies have collected, collated, and produced basic intelligence data in a uniform and coherent pattern. These files assembled under the need for NIS production represent a vast reservoir of information available immediately to all departments at the outset of hostilities.

2. Wartime mission and functions

The OBI concept is that the NIS Program, operating under the direction of the interagency NIS Committee as at present, is the proper and most effective instrument to coordinate the production of basic intelligence required by the Government in the event of a global war.

The entire NIS mechanism -- the NIS Committee, the interagency allocation of collection and production responsibilities, the backlog of departmental experience in the production of national basic intelligence, and the experienced staff in OBI--- will be available for use as the most efficient channel through which to direct and secure response to strategic and high-level operational requirements for basic intelligence. The NIS Committee can, by extension of its day-to-day peacetime activities, immediately translate requirements for special wartime basic intelligence into coherent production schedules organized according to the particular governmental component with the greatest competence to furnish the desired information. In other words, the NIS mechanism can generate a maximum of interagency capabilities with a minimum of interagency communications.

Establishing communications with the other NIS Committee members will be the first requirement following relocation.

Another immediate problem which would face OBI in event of war would be emergency printing facilities. OBI has begun arrangements to have printing establishments outside the Washington area listed to aid in printing the NIS in wartime.

3. Summary

a. The NIS Program will have ready for immediate use in event of war a large and growing body of published basic intelligence disseminated throughout the Government and at major commands.

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b. The NIS mechanism as it exists during peacetime would continue to operate in a wartime situation.

25X1A9a

[ ] both of the Office of Operations, talked about overt collection in wartime.according to the following outline:

25X1A7b

25X1A9a

[ ] Chief, Services Division, ORR, discussed economic intelligence in wartime.according to the following outline:

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1. Peacetime capabilities

Economic Research Area has about [ ] with primary 25X1A
responsibility in the Intelligence Community for the analyzing of
economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. Wartime plans

Economic Research Area will continue to carry out production
and coordination of economic intelligence with effort directed primarily
to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Will be concerned almost entirely with
current reporting and appraisal of events in the Sino-Soviet Area;
status of civilians; "damage assessment."

Current support will be given in four ways:

a. Through National Intelligence Estimates
b. Through Current Intelligence Center
c. Through DD/I and DCI to the NSC
d. Through appropriate sections of the Office of
   the Secretary of Defense.

It is expected that during the initial phase, a substantial
number of conflicting reports will be received. We will be required
to sort out the fact from fiction and to evaluate them. Coordination
on an interagency basis (through EIC) will be a very important part.

3. Long-range plans

Economic Research Area has one plan which must be flexible.

Principal personnel changes anticipated:

Personnel will be reallocated to perform priority
tasks. Increases would be mainly military. It is an-
ticipated that an increase of approximately 90% would
be required. The size of the EIC would require con-
siderable augmentation.

25X1A9a

[ ] as the CIA Member of the Planning Committee for
Economic Warfare, ODM, talked about economic warfare support by
ORR according to the following outline:

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Economic warfare is the process of developing and implementing a program for the reduction of enemy war potential by the limitation of his foreign sources of economic supply.

Modern economy is an exceedingly complex apparatus consisting of a wide range of exchanges of raw materials and of an elaborate mechanism of exchange involving transport and credit documents. This mechanism is indispensible to the consummation of the movements and susceptible to knowledge and intercept by an effective collection process.

The assets existing in the Agency include the Trade Controls Branch in the Services Division of the Economic Research Area.

Four avenues of approach showing the status of our war planning situation are:

1. Indigenous (ORR/ERA) plans for general economic warfare support

2. Participation in organizational planning for Emergency Agency on Economic Warfare

3. Coordination of intelligence support program through EDIC, and

4. Development of control channels for effective receipt and dissemination of information available under emergency conditions.

The function of the ORR/CIA support for economic warfare is to:

1. Provide intelligence essential to the establishment and enforcement of:

    a. Controls over exports
    b. Controls over the movement of ships and aircraft
    c. Foreign exchange and asset controls
    d. War trade agreements

2. Provide current information on individuals and organizations which:

    a. Have violated security controls, or
    b. May perform unfriendly acts.

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3. Provide economic intelligence support for:

    a. Application of military measures against economic targets

    b. Sabotage, and

    c. Prevention of enemy exports.

4. Provide intelligence on Sino-Soviet Bloc external economic operations.

The intelligence support function for economic warfare is in large part in place at the present time and is engaged in the production of intelligence which would be of direct use in quickly implementing an emergency program of economic warfare. We must preserve flexibility of these war plans to reflect changes in the Agency in case of war.

25X1A9a

                    [   ], Special Assistant to the Chief, Geographic Research, ORR, described the role of geographic intelligence in wartime according to the following outline:

The Geographic Research Area (GRA) is composed of four sub-activities: (1) geographic analysis; (2) cartographic production; (3) photo interpretation; and (4) map procurement and reference. By nature of its data, geographic intelligence is strongly concerned with support of operational and strategic planning, but has considerable use in support of policy determination, estimates, and current reporting. The organization and techniques of geographic intelligence as we accept them now were established primarily on the basis of experience in World War II. The growth and development of the geographic intelligence effort in Washington and in the field was discussed. Experience in World War II established four desirable features for geographic intelligence operations:

1. Should be a team activity
2. Should make intensive use of photo interpretation
3. Should maintain capability to apply efforts on a world-wide basis to a wide range of requirements
4. Should coordinate closely with other geographic elements of community in procurement and utilization of files.

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GRA presently organized to integrate these four activities as follows:

1. Geography Division

   a. regional analysis
   b. border and route studies
   c. urban area analysis
   d. unconventional warfare, escape and evasion, and targeting
   e. reporting of trends and developments

2. Cartography Division -- special subject maps

3. Photo Intelligence Division -- photo interpretation support

4. Map Library Division

   a. map procurement
   b. Agency and community reference service related to intelligence

War Plan for GRA

Practically no change from present mission. Since specific types of support are difficult to estimate, GRA approach to war plan emphasizes flexibility and widening of capabilities of staff. We anticipate an immediate and heavy load, primarily in support of special operations. We would envision field support, under DD/P, by already experienced field teams of geographic intelligence personnel.

At Headquarters initially:

1. support of evaluations of current situations
2. support of requests for spot area analysis
3. assistance from Map Reference service

Next stage:

1. rapid and concurrent increase in requests for photo interpretation
2. cartographic services
3. geographic intelligence support to targeting

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4. unconventional warfare
5. escape and evasion
6. economic research requirements

Finally:

1. establishment of map collection teams in field commands
2. prepare special teams of geographic intelligence and service personnel

Wartime Situation Build-up

Personnel increase of about 40% will be necessary (excluding Photo Intelligence Division). Photo Intelligence Division's estimated increase is 300%.

Summary

Widen range of capabilities, but heavy focus inevitable on operational support.

Essential to place that support where request originates.

Recognize problem of size of Relocation Center — seek 25X1B4d alternate quarters for the longer war.

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25X1B4d

A detailed approach to the problem of wartime operation is set forth in four plans, based on these assumed conditions:

 a. an increase in the number of incidents (the cold war becomes hotter)

 b. limited hostilities without US participation -- how to get US teams into foreign lands

 c. limited war with US participation -- field operations set up in each theater

25X1B4d d. Global war

17 July 1957

25X1A9a

[   ] Deputy Assistant Director for Production, OSI, discussed scientific intelligence in wartime according to the following outline:

Definitions

1. Scientific Intelligence

 a. study of foreign scientific capabilities
 b. application of science to the process of intelligence

2. Technical Intelligence

 The study and description of existing foreign materiel

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Functions in Wartime

1. Short, all-out nuclear war (60 to 120 days)

   Join others in the community in just trying to survive.
   Mainly concerned with technical intelligence

2. Long, drawn-out conflict

   Steps:

   a. get force to relocation site, with as many necessary
      documents on hand as possible and analysts capable
      of working on own

   b. plan for gradual assumption of liaison relations
      with other agencies

   c. establishment of connection with various ex-
      ploitation centers

   d. maintenance of relations with research and develop-
      ment components in military agencies

   e. establish relations with key scientists.

   Types of Demands Anticipated:

   a. assessment of enemy status
   b. bomb damage assessment
   c. military planning (e.g., air defense system)

   Probable Types of Production:

   a. contribution to NIE's
   b. increase of activity in current intelligence
   c. evaluation of information for DDI and DCI
   d. self-initiated reports
   e. some detailed studies -- research and development
      type of thing
   f. feasibility study on getting information

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. Allocation of Personnel:

    a. some to various types of exploitation in field
       and at home
    b. to evaluating of material
    c. liaison activities -- relationships with other
       agencies
    d. joint studies with military agencies.

25X1A9a

[ ] Chief of the Nuclear Energy Division,
OSI, spoke on technical intelligence in wartime according to the
following outline:

In covering technical intelligence, there are two basic
things to consider:

    1. What subject in terms of military equipment and
weapons systems we are concerned with.

    2. What type of intelligence work we would have to
perform.

In a hot war, scientific and technical intelligence comes into
its own. Technical intelligence is concerned with hardware—
character, design, and methods of production.

Technical intelligence is primarily the responsibility
of the services in time of peace and war.

CIA's responsibilities in technical intelligence:

    1. In CIA we have, in large measure, all aspects of
scientific intelligence, and good expertise on them.

    2. Our technical intelligence responsibilities:

        a. National Intelligence Estimates, etc.
        b. large measure proposes departmental intelligence
        c. clandestine collection effort, directed to
           collection of technical intelligence.

The hard core of scientific intelligence continues, but would
automatically switch to technical intelligence in wartime,
because of:

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1. Our responsibilities in the field as they evolve
   during wartime

2. Experience from World War II and Korea

3. Impact or type of war in which we are engaged
   (short duration or long term).

Various sides to be considered by scientific intelligence are:

1. Evaluation side--putting together information that
   would help us counteract some of their weapons and
   equipment. Support judgment on these subjects.

2. Collection side--directing collection toward the
   above problems. Outlined what roles would be
   played by the following fields:

   a. Nuclear Energy
   b. Guided Missiles--collecting information
      here and overseas
   c. Electronics--in all weapons systems
   d. BW/CW--has it been used? Will they use it?
      Technical Threats.
   e. Conventional military equipment--not much work
      in this field unless it is a long war.

Summary:

   In wartime situation, OSI will evolve technical intelligence
expertise to bring to bear on this problem. They have to get things
going (a) technical teams set up; (b) pilot interrogations; (c) guid-
ing clandestine activities in Agency; and (d) follow-up to getting
technical teams in.

25X1A9a

[   ] Chief, Planning Staff, OCI, discussed
current intelligence in wartime. He pointed out that there were
two major problems in this connection: (a) a need to put out more
intelligence on a current basis, and (b) how adequately to coordinate
this production. To meet these problems he said that the four main
criteria were:

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1. Where the information comes from in time of war
2. When the information ceases to be current intelligence
3. Who sees this intelligence
4. What will be the production hazards we will have to face.

He then discussed the current intelligence annex to the Global War Plan for the DD/I Area.

25X1A9a

[   ] spoke on the war room and support therefor, according to the following outline:

25X1A9a

[   ] quoted from a letter which had been sent from Cdr. Beach at the White House as follows: "...furnish assistance to providing "Situation Room" in the White House... OCI to provide current intelligence data as need for this "Situation Room."

Criteria for "Situation Room" (two were established: one in White House and one in White House Relocation Center):

1. Space available
2. Room not to be elaborate
3. Except under emergency situations, the President would be briefed in his office -- this room a stand-by operation
4. Support for room with other IAC chiefs--Joint Chiefs of Staff from Pentagon
5. Room to be completed by Operation Alert 1957, 20 July 1957.

The President's Naval Aide is responsible for briefing the President. "Situation Room" is run on 24 hour a day basis in the White House.

Problems involved (at Relocation Center):
1. Briefer's lifeline is by wire with outside world
2. Background information provided in each briefing room (for briefer)
3. Staffing on 24 hour basis

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Physical facilities:
1. Maps -- CIA and JCS consider present maps sufficient
2. "View-graph" -- for JCS briefer
3. Communications equipment

Cartographic support: Section in OCI. Also receive
support from ORR and, in fact, the whole government
are on call.

. The Central Support Services in Wartime to be provided by ORR
and OCR was the subject of presentations by [   ], Chief,   25X1A9a
Liaison Division, OCR, and [   ] of ORR.   25X1A9a

[   ] presentation was as outlined below: 25X1A9a

Support services to be rendered by OCR
What the capabilities are in the event of an emergency
situation

Documents Division

Central point in the Agency which receives, codes, indexes,
and disseminates all intelligence documents from outside
agencies as well as CIA-produced reports. TS control.
Determination of release of CIA documents to outside
offices and overseas areas.

Cable Center (also part of Documents Division above)

Focal point for receiving and dissemination of all
non-CIA cables. Maintenance of a complete file of the
current cables received by the Agency.

Liaison Division

Process and coordinate collection requirements which call
for action in the field.

Collection of information that might have intelligence
significance from non-IAC agencies.

To establish and maintain operational relations with other
agencies in the US Government.

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Conclusion

That there is an organization in existence which, in case of emergency, can obtain the material necessary to the work of the community.

25X1A9a

⌷⌷⌷⌷⌷⌷⌷ presentation was as outlined below:

Support services to be rendered by GRA

Three units are concerned, namely: (1) Map Library Division; (2) Photo Intelligence Division; and (3) Cartography Division.

1. Map Library Division

    a. History of development
    b. Its current activities in support are reference and procurement related to maps and map materials on foreign areas.

    (1) Reference

        Center in government for intelligence type map materials

        Focus on special subject maps

        Collection restricted to latest and best maps

    (2) Procurement

        two-fold responsibility

        (a) Foreign   25X1C4a

        (b) Domestic

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Run with cooperation of OO. Involves procurement of foreign map and map materials as available from domestic sources. Also services spot requirements.

c. In Wartime Situation

We anticipate services presently available will remain essentially the same.

(1) Professional assistance in map and map materials

(2) Special procurement of maps

(3) Information on coordinates, place names, etc.

(4) Circulation of Acquisitions Lists

A collection of about 50 thousand maps is presently in the Relocation Center. These represent what we believe would be essential for any wartime situation, but it would be well for those interested in this material to check the stock to see that their needs are covered.

Primary effort will be devoted to augmentation of map-procurement.

Establishment of four-man teams attached to field commanders.

Community coordination of collection will be maintained, emphasizing CIA responsibility for captured maps relating to Headquarters requirements.

Need for continued close coordination with other map collections.

2. Photo Intelligence Division

Entirely a military services development during World War II; refinement of photo intelligence in Korean War. D/GP set up in 1953.

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Types of people involved:

    a. Photo Reader
    b. Photo Interpreter
    c. Photogrammetrist
    d. Photo Intelligence Officer

In Wartime:

Will continue to be the CIA and NSC Center for photo intelligence services and training. Functions will remain essentially the same. Will continue to emphasize flexibility, new experience, and a wide range of substantive training.

Expect wide variety of support tasks:

    1. Continuing surveillance of strategic areas
    2. Immediate and heavy load in current reporting
    3. Expanded support of operational and strategic planning
    4. Direct support of NSC
    5. Large contribution to OCI, OSI and ORR research projects as priorities permit
    6. Training in PI will be accelerated and enlarged
    7. PI personnel will be prepared for service with the Geographic Intelligence teams (probably 10 PI men per team)
    8. Will require intimate coordination with military services

Capability of the unit will depend on the extent of expansion of its personnel. We contemplate a 300% increase will be necessary.

Establishment of a central Photo Interpretation Center in the Government may be necessary.

3. Cartography Division

Currently has the responsibility in CIA for production of intelligence maps, charts and cartograms.

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Present support functions include:

1. Provide maps for intelligence reports
2. Substantive research for background data
3. Review and correction of standard reference maps
4. Handle problems in mathematical geography
5. Technical research

Wartime Situation:

1. The Center has been equipped with material and equipment considered necessary for minimum emergency use.

2. It is expected that very shortly after deployment, a Priority Review Group will be necessary.

3. Special emphasis to support of clandestine operations.

4. Additional support to the President's Situation Room

5. Will prepare cartographic elements for special Geographic Intelligence Field teams

6. Close coordination with other cartography units in Government

7. Continue to provide cartographic support to Department of State

8. Must retain flexibility

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25X1A9a

[REDACTED], Chief, Biographic Register, OCR, discussed the Central Reference services in wartime according to the following outline:

The mission of OCR is to insure that all intelligence information which is produced in the intelligence community is sent to CIA, disseminated within CIA, properly indexed by subject and area, and that the Agency has a library available to it.

In addition, OCR has taken special measures to insure that this information will be readily accessible.

The wartime plan would depend on the type of war in which we are involved.

1. Situation where we do not relocate—under these conditions, there would be very little change from our present activities and the Central Reference services now available, would also be available in wartime. However, emphasis would turn to the area of primary concern. More reports would be written and more information disseminated to the field. More cables would be received.

2. Situation when we do relocate—vital materials are available.

Vital Materials

Informal list made by OCR of materials which they felt should be included in vital materials storage. This list was sent to all offices for their review with request that they supplement with the documents necessary to them in the event of relocation.

Vital Materials Committee of the DD/I is chaired by OCR. Their mission is to plan for and coordinate over DD/I Vital Material Program and recommend to the DD/I and the AD's, specific action for improvement in the program.

Typical Materials Contained in Vital Repository

1. Photo copies of raw materials
2. IBM cards referencing documents
3. Copies of Intelligence Publication Index and copies of each document referred to

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4. Non-CIA cables covering period of six months; TS over one year period
5. Reference books

This information would provide facilities for research similar to those available in Washington, D. C.

Facilities in OCR are:

1. [   ]   25X1A
2. Graphics Register--graphics material
3. Industrial Register--target folders on cities and towns
4. CIA Library

25X1A9a [   ] expressed several of his own opinions:

1. We will not relocate unless Washington is under nuclear attack.
2. Intelligence needs will be limited in the event of war to recent cables, NIE's, SNIE's, OSI, ORR, and OCI studies, and orders of battle.

The problem of coordination of intelligence production in wartime was discussed by [   ], presently of   25X1A9a
the Office of the Deputy Director (Coordination), but formerly
Executive Secretary of the Economic Intelligence Committee. Dr.
25X1A9a [   ] spoke according to the following outline:

We are here to do some planning on actual facilities which
would be available in a wartime situation. In connection with this,
the following points should be considered:

1. Personnel--do we have people who know about such things as world-wide petroleum supply, agricultural situation, etc.?
2. Reference files--do we have all material necessary on hand or know where we can get it?
3. Communications channels--can we contact the knowledgeable people and agencies?

Overall Responsibilities of IAC in Wartime:

         NSC   DCI   IAC

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What will the IAC do? -- They will be concerned with integrating political, scientific, economic and military intelligence into support estimates of:

1. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions
2. Intentions and uncommitted countries
3. Capabilities and requirements (logistics and supply) of allied and uncommitted countries
4. Postwar economic and political situations

In Wartime, Intelligence Community must:

1. Support IAC in production of NIE's
2. Support other operations and wartime programs

This will require many studies not presently being undertaken -- for example, analysis of economic and logistic situations on a world-wide basis. How do we propose to cover those areas presently outside our routine operations? Especially world food, POL and medical supply situations. Important that planners in Washington are in general understanding with those in the field. Better to "service" requests from knowledgeable people in the field than to attempt to press unsolicited Washington "analysis."

Why do we need coordinated (integrated) intelligence support?

1. Need policy agreements (inter-agency)
2. Need better technical analysis in support of both policy and operational decisions

Conclusions:

1. Less concern about arrangements for producing NIE's than for adequacy of detailed technical analysis of new and different types of problems -- especially of world requirements for logistics and supply.

2. Ask the working-level people to think in more detail about the problems they must face, including how they would expect to get together.

3. More emphasis in contacting knowledgeable individual personnel.

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People in other agencies who should be called in.

The key conclusion is that planning should not be so much to predetermined organization patterns and delineations of office responsibility as for arranging to assemble quickly the technical competence (with the necessary back-stopping) necessary to analyze emergency situations.

18 July 1957

25X1A9a

[ ] O/DD/I, discussed the recommendations made by the Killian Committee and how these recommendations were being staffed within the Intelligence Community. Two of the recommendations have direct bearing on the operation of the DD/I Area in wartime. One of these concerns itself with the wartime organization of the Intelligence Community, and the other with the revision of the NSCID's.

25X1A9a

[ ] of the Management Staff, DD/S, described briefly the Vital Materials Program and pointed out that OCR had ✶ executive responsibility within the DD/I Area for the accomplishment of the program. He was very generous with his praise of the excellence of the Vital Materials Program within the DD/I Area.

The balance of the day was spent in drafting the paper attached to this report as Tab "C".

✶ No ~~signature~~

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S E C R E T

26 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Asst. to DD/I (Plng)

THROUGH: AD/RR
                  Chief, ERA
                  Chief, D/S
                  Acting Chief, S/TD

25X1A9a   FROM: [   ], S/TD

SUBJECT: Report of Participation in Operation Alert-1957 as
           CIA Representative on the Executive Committee of
           the Emergency Economic Agency

1. Background

A simulated "Office of Economic Warfare" was established by
Presidential Order in June 1957 during Operation Alert. An OEW
"Administrator" was made responsible for the coordination, direction,
and control of all economic activities of the U.S. Government which
would be applied against the enemy to impair his ability to wage war.
Placed under the Administrator's aegis were export controls, preclu-
sive buying, blacklisting and financial controls.*/

The name of the Office was changed during the latter stages of
Operation Alert to Emergency Economic Administration at the sugges-
tion of the President, who wanted the emergency character of the war-
time agencies emphasized, and the new name is used throughout this
report. CIA is one of EEA's constituent agencies.

The EEA began to take simulated actions when "C" status of Oper-
ation Alert was reached. During "D" status, its Executive Committee
was moved for the period 12-19 July to the ODM relocation center where
further action was taken.

The Executive Committee participants were as follows:

ODM	Fred Winant, Chairman
Treasury	Edwin F. Rains
State	Clarence W. Nichols
Defense	H. Frank McCaffrey
Commerce	Nathaniel Knowles
CIA	

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*/ Copy of the Presidential Order and statement of Administrator's
   mission and functions are attached.

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This report covers the highlights of the exercise to date from the point of view of intelligence. Results of additional discussions and findings in ODM will be reported later.

2. General Comments

There is an adequate amount of Sino-Soviet bloc intelligence available to support EEA, but under wartime conditions, the communication of intelligence, especially of lengthy data, may be difficult. For that reason consideration must be given to having selected intelligence always available to EEA and certain other agencies at their relocation centers. Operation Alert demonstrated the advantages an aggressor has in modern warfare, and the need for carefully pre-planned, self-triggering, self-sustaining counter-measures of say 90-day duration, to avoid ineffectual improvisations once the attack has started. The Operation also showed that the mission and functions and the operations of EEA needs to be reviewed and further developed if the Agency is to be effective in wartime.

CIA is not directly involved in this aspect of the review, but the EEA and ODM planners are interested in the operational support that may be expected from the Agency.

3. Specific Comments and Observations

a. Export Controls in Wartime.

Operation Alert, once again demonstrated that in time of war one of the most difficult aspects of export controls is the problem of controlling trade with allies and neutrals. The "survival" commodities need to be allocated and the neutrals need to be persuaded not to make these commodities available to the enemy. Actions against the enemy in wartime such as freezing of assets and stoppage of all trade, blacklisting, and preclusive buying are well recognized. It was generally agreed that economic warfare measures against an enemy such as the Sino-Soviet bloc would be of marginal significance as the bloc has a high degree of self-sufficiency. The EEA "scenario" did not consider the effects of retaliatory bombing of the aggressor which would have changed his economic capabilities and made the problem of preclusive buying more important.

b. Problems Concerning the Establishment of EEA

Because of the many delicate diplomatic problems relating to allies and neutrals, and because there are already in existence forums such as ACEP under the Secretary of Commerce where such problems are worked out on an inter-agency basis, some members

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of the EEA Executive Committee felt that there is no need for EEA.
Furthermore, certain laws are in effect which vest some of the
agencies with responsibility for various aspects of export controls;
the powers vested in the EEA need to be reconciled with existing
legislation. (Congress could **ex post facto** approve emergency admin-
istrative actions of the President).

Another unresolved problem is the relation of EEA to the Emer-
gency Production Agency, which would in wartime be given powers
over procurement and allocation of "survival commodities".1/ Would
allocation to neutrals and allies of these commodities be accomp-
lished by this agency, or by EEA or by ACEP? Would EEA or ACEP
handle the non "survival" commodities? What kind of licensing sys-
tem is best adapted to wartime? (general or validated?) Should a
general embargo be imposed at the start of a war? Many other
technical and organizational problems were raised but not resolved
during the operation, which indicate the need of further planning, and
clarification of authority. On this point there was unanimous
agreement.

c. Preclusive Buying.

Operation Alert demonstrated the need of further re-study of
this problem. CIA furnished EEA with a short list of commodities
for the guidance of preclusive buying activity. A simulated pre-
clusive buying program was begun by EEA which revealed many plan-
ning deficiencies which would have prevented speedy implementation.
Unless adequate planning exists the aggressor, knowing his needs
and the time-table will have secured the needed commodities in
neutral countries. Secondly, the problem of buying special commo-
dities seems to separate itself into a series of unique country-
commodity problems each one with its own peculiarities (e.g. anti-
biotics in Switzerland; beryl in India.) The technicalities of
planning and of execution of the simulated problem proved themselves
to be very substantial and much more work needs to be done to devel-
op an effective system. It was felt that pre-planning was vital.
The need for coordination with allies also was stressed. One of
the unanswered questions raised by an Operation Alert cable was the
availability of CIA support to execute the preclusive buying program.

d. Blacklisting

Operation Alert brought out the difficulties of creating a con-
solidated black list under wartime conditions. In a simulated act-
ion the responsibility was assigned by EEA to Commerce with the
participation of other agencies. Many agencies, (Commerce, CIA,

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1/ The publication of such a list was simulated by the EPA.

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Defense, Treasury) have data for the compilation of a black and "grey" list, but the frames of reference are not the same and data are not freely interchanged in peace time because of security and "third agency rules". It was agreed that more planning is necessary. Possibly a standby list should be compiled to be used in an emergency and provisions should be made for coordinating the list with certain allies in time of war.

4. Recommendations

a. CIA to continue participation in ODM planning.

b. CIA to consider the proposal that it render operational support to a preclusive buying program in wartime. (Coordinate with DD/P and A/DDI/P)

c. CIA to study the desirability and feasibility of making certain basic data on Sino-Soviet bloc available to ODM at its relocation center for ready reference in an emergency (e.g. OCI country hand-books, selected NIE's, selected data from estimates files.)

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Attachment:
Presidential Order D-105. (Test exercise only)

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